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Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and
the Constitution
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER*
Michigan State University College of Law
This Article explores the impact of a same-sex marriage amendment
on the place of Indian tribes in the Federal Constitution. A same-sex
marriage amendment, depending on the text, might serve to incorpo-
rate Indian tribes into the Federal Union as the third sovereign. The
Constitution has not been amended to incorporate Indian tribes into
the Federal Union, rendering their place in Our Federalism uncertain
and unpredictable. A same-sex marriage amendment that applies to
limit or expand tribal authority to recognize or authorize same-sex
marriage could constitute an implicit recognition of Indian tribes as
the third sovereign in the American system of federalism. Even an
amendment that excludes mention of Indian tribes may have some-
thing to say about Indian tribes as the third sovereign.
INTRODUCTION
In a 19th century Michigan Supreme Court case immortalized by
Robert Traver's Laughing Whitefish,' the court upheld the inheritance
rights of the child of a polygamous marriage between two Chippewa
Indians in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.2 The court wrote that "we
had no more right to control [tribal] domestic usages than those of Tur-
key or India."3 Taking judicial notice "that among these Indians polyga-
mous marriages have always been recognized as valid,"4 the court
* Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law; Director, Indigenous Law
Program; Enrolled Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians; Appellate
Judge, Hoopa Valley Tribe, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, and Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. Professor Fletcher is former in-
house counsel at the Pasqua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, the Hoopa Valley Tribe, the Suquamish
Tribe, and the Grand Traverse Band, and he has litigated over two dozen tribal court cases. Chi-
miigwetch to Wenona Singel, without whom this paper could not have been written.
1. ROBERT TRAVER, LAUGHING WHITEFISH (1965). Mr. Traver was the pen name of John D.
Voelker, the former Michigan Supreme Court justice who wrote Anatomy of a Murder. Frederick
M. Baker, Jr. & Rich Vander Veen III, John D. Voelker: Michigan's Literary Justice, 79 MICH.
B.J. 530 (2000); Books Received, 18 STAN. L. REV. 779, 780 (1966). For a description and partial
explanation of Anishinaabe (Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi) practices of polygamy, see
JAMES A. CLIFTON, THE POKAGONS, 1683-1983: CATHOLIC POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF THE ST.
JOSEPH RIVER VALLEY 61 (1984); RUTH LANDES, OJIBWA SOCIOLOGY 53-86 (1937).
2. Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. 1889).
3. Id. at 605.
4. Id.
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identified a conundrum: "We must either hold that there can be no valid
Indian marriage, or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by
Indian usages are so regarded. There is no middle ground which can be
taken, so long as our own laws are not binding on the tribes."5
Times have changed. Most, if not all, Indian tribes no longer rec-
ognize polygamous marriages6 and Indian people tend to utilize the
divorce laws as much as non-Indian people.7 The Upper Peninsula is no
longer on the fringes of the American frontier.8 Moreover, the laws of
states often do apply to Indians and sometimes even Indian tribes. 9 It
remains settled black-letter law, however, that Indian tribes retain ple-
nary and exclusive inherent authority over "domestic relations among
tribal members."' 0
The fact that tribes control their own domestic relations well into
the "modem era"'1 of federal-state-tribal relations is a function of the sui
generis character of federal Indian law.12 Tribal authority has survived
major changes after Congress instructed the President to cease treaty-
making with Indian tribes in 1871,' 3 after Congress declared all Indians
to be citizens in 1924,14 and after Congress experimented with extending
state civil jurisdiction into large parts of Indian Country in 1953.15
Retained tribal authority may also be a function of the place of family
law in "Our Federalism" 16 that designates domestic relations all but off-
5. Id.
6. E.g., BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY TRIBAL CODE § 1401 (2004), available at http://
www.narf.org/ nill/Codes/baymillscode/chapterl4marriage.htm.
7. E.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982); Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian
L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals 1997).
8. Compare RICHARD M. DORSON, BLOODSTOPPERS & BEARWALKERS: FOLK TRADITIONS OF
THE UPPER PENINSULA (1952) (describing Upper Peninsula traditions from frontier times), with
JIM HARRISON, TRUE NORTH (2004) (fictionalizing the end of frontier times in the Upper
Peninsula).
9. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005) (upholding a
state tax against a non-Indian retailer who passed the cost down to an Indian tribe); County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)
(holding that a state may tax land located within an Indian reservation and owned by an Indian
where the land had been alienated in the Allotment Era).
10. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 4.01[2][c], at 215
(Nell Jessup Newton, ed. 2005) (citing Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); United States v.
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916)).
11. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987) [hereinafter
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS].
12. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
13. COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.03[9], at 74-75.
14. Id. § 1.04, at 83-84.
15. Id. § 1.06, at 96-97.
16. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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limits to federal authority.' 7 This last, vigorous bastion of retained tribal
governmental authority may become the staging grounds for an Ameri-
can constitutional rift.
The exclusion of state laws from Indian Country 8 in the arena of
marriage has not generated much dispute in comparison with the litiga-
tion over, for example, Indian child adoption and custody. 9 But that
relative stillness may be in jeopardy. A few tribal legislatures and tribal
courts have confronted the contentious subject of same-sex marriage.
The Cherokee Nation's highest court has dismissed on procedural
grounds a challenge to the marriage of a lesbian couple under tribal
law.2" The Cherokee and Navajo legislatures have acted to prohibit
same-sex marriages in their respective jurisdictions.2' While the issue of
same-sex marriages is far from the forefront of tribal governmental
issues compared to issues such as tribal economic development22 and
tribal criminal jurisdiction,23 there remains the distinct possibility that
one or more of the 560-plus federally recognized Indian tribes 24 will
take action to recognize same-sex marriage in their jurisdictions.
Numerous states have taken action to ban same-sex marriage, but
not all.25 And, in some jurisdictions, federal and state courts have deter-
mined that any such legislation would violate the Equal Protection
Clause and other federal or state constitutional provisions.26 As a result,
17. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 273 (1945); Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny,
Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 240-50
(2005).
18. "Indian Country" is a term of art defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
19. See COHEN, supra note 10, §§ 11.01-11.08, at 819-56.
20. See In re the Marriage License of McKinley, No. JAT-04-15 (Judicial Appeals Tribunal
of the Cherokee Nation 2005), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org/ (registration required);
In re the Marriage License of McKinley, No. JAT-05-11 (Judicial Appeals Tribunal of the
Cherokee Nation 2005), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org/ (registration required);
Cherokee Court Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Challenge, INDIANZ.COM, Jan. 5, 2006, available at
http://indianz.com/News/2OO6/011890.asp.
21. See Wyatt Buchanan, Bay Area Celebration, Setbacks for Gay Indigenous People; They'll
Mark Parade Grand Marshal, Loss on Marriage Front, S.F. CHRON., June 25, 2005, at B I,
available at 2005 WLNR 10025760.
22. See generally Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian
Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597 (2004).
23. See generally Morris v. Tanner, No. 03-35922, 2005 WL 3525598 (9th Cir. Dec. 22,
2005), cert. denied 2006 WL 927031 (Oct. 10, 2006); Will Trachman, Tribal Criminal
Jurisdiction after U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 847 (2005).
24. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 70 Fed. Reg. 71194 (Nov. 25, 2005).
25. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous Constitutional
Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of
Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 614 n.45 (2005).
26. E.g., Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005),
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some opponents of same-sex marriage have proposed an amendment to
the United States Constitution banning same-sex marriage. 7 On the
other hand, the American people may one day ratify an amendment that
precludes governmental restriction on same-sex marriage. While it
appears far from certain that such amendments would pass, this Article
explores such an amendment's broader statement about the place of
Indian tribes in the United States Constitution.
If the Constitution can be divided into two general categories of
provisions, structural and individual rights provisions,28 a same-sex mar-
riage amendment could have either a dramatic, or not-so-dramatic,
impact on Indian tribes. A same-sex marrage amendment, operating as
a structural amendment and depending on the text, might serve to incor-
porate Indian tribes into the Federal Union as the third sovereign, a topic
often discussed by federal Indian law scholars.29 While Indian tribes as
sovereign entities predated the Constitution and did not participate in the
discussions over the founding document,3 ° the territory of the American
state has engulfed and the federal government has asserted exclusive
authority over the tribes.3 Despite this fact, the Constitution has not
been amended to incorporate Indian tribes into the Federal Union, ren-
overruled by Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006); Goodridge v.
Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
27. See Krotoszynski & Spitko, supra note 25, at 638; Joseph William Singer, Same Sex
Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, I STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 2
(2005), available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/stjcrcl I &id=5&
collection=journals; Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks
to Federalism in Family Law, 2 ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 139 (2004).
28. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Do Constitutional Provisions Matter? Canada's Recognition
of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 17 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Michigan Department of Political Science) (citing Cass Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies:
An Epilogue, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 327 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad, eds.
1988)). Cf. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1114-20
(2005) (describing the election law "rights-structure debate").
29. See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 113, 160 (2002); Frank Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows: The Missing Narrative in
Indian Law, 80 N.D. L. REV. 743 (2004) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows];
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Dualism and the Dialogic of Incorporation in Federal Indian Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 28 (2006), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/ 119/
dec05/skibine.shtml (last visited April 13, 2006); Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara,
Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47 (2004); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need
for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003); Carol Tebben, An American
Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318
(2003).
30. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005).
31. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996); Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002).
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dering their place in Our Federalism uncertain and unpredictable.32 A
same-sex marriage amendment that results in limiting or expanding tri-
bal authority to recognize or authorize same-sex marriage could consti-
tute an implicit recognition of Indian tribes as the third sovereign in the
American system of federalism. Even an amendment that excludes
mention of Indian tribes may have something to say about Indian tribes
as the third sovereign.
As to individual rights, a same-sex marriage amendment that
excludes Indian tribes would raise important questions about whether
the Constitution's individual rights declarations and protections apply to
the exercise of tribal governmental authority. As the law stands, the Bill
of Rights and other individual rights protections do not limit the exercise
of tribal governmental authority.33 For example, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, which sets the age for federal elections at eighteen rather
than twenty-one, does not apply to Indian tribes.34 But the same federal
circuit implied that, without making the specific holding, Indian tribes
might not be allowed to set the voting age at twenty-one in contraven-
tion of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment." If an amendment passed
prohibiting all same-sex marriages but excluding mention of Indian
tribes, would that amendment limit tribal recognition and authorization
of such marriages? If an amendment passed prohibiting restrictions on
same-sex marriage and again omitting mention of Indian tribes, would
that amendment limit tribal authority? These issues raise larger ques-
tions about the Constitution's application to Indian tribes and to the third
sovereign's place in Our Federalism.
Part I describes the state of law relating to Indian tribes' incorpora-
tion into the federal Constitution. Indian tribes predate the Constitution.
The Founders did not conceive Indian tribes as being part of the Federal
Union because they were located outside the territorial bounds of the
original thirteen states. As a result, the tribes were not included in the
32. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 219 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("schizophrenic"); Philip P. Frickey,
(Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 434-35 (2005)
[hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism]; Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1754
(1997); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (1996) [hereinafter Getches,
Conquering]; Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional
Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 403 (1991/1992).
33. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959); STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND
TRIBES 278-79 (Southern Illinois University Press, 3rd ed. 2002).
34. See Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.
1975).
35. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 820 (1978). Contra Wounded Head, 507 F.2d at 1081.
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provisions of the Constitution except as outside governmental entities.
But while history shows that Indian tribes are now surrounded by the
states, the Constitution lags behind in recognizing the legal implications
of that fact. As a result, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
are slow to recognize the validity of exercises of tribal governmental
authority. Moreover, because Indian tribes predate the Constitution and
because the Founders excluded Indian tribes, the restrictions on govern-
mental activity included in the Constitution do not, as a general matter,
apply to tribal governments. Therefore, Indian tribes are left as outsid-
ers in the constitutional scheme of protecting individual rights while pre-
serving tribal self-determination. In sum, these constitutional conditions
tend to convince the Supreme Court to restrict the authority of tribal
governments to that of private associations, where their laws apply in
very limited circumstances.36
Part II opens with a general description of the debate about same-
sex marriage in the United States and in Indian Country. In the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA),37 Congress included Indian tribes in the Act's
application,38 which was neither the first nor the last time Congress
enacted legislation that recognized Indian tribes as a third sovereign.39
In part as a result of this enactment, some Indian tribes have begun to
confront the possibility of either recognizing or banning same-sex mar-
riage. The cultural context of this debate is far removed from the cul-
tural context of the same-sex marriage debate outside of Indian
Country.4" Part II also mentions the possibility that the American peo-
ple may enact an amendment to the Constitution banning same-sex mar-
riage. Such a ban, like the DOMA, might include Indian tribes in its
provisions, but the draft proposals tend not to include Indian tribes.
Part III analyzes the less likely scenario in which the American
people enact a constitutional amendment on same-sex marriage, either
banning or protecting same-sex marriage, and include Indian tribes in
the text. This Article argues that such an amendment would serve as a
formal, yet implicit, incorporation of Indian tribes into Our Federalism,
alongside states, as powerful and recognized sovereigns with separate
and unique authorities and rights. The Supreme Court has identified
36. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). See COHEN, supra note 10,
§ 7.02, at 599-607. But see United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.).
37. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at I U.S.C. § 7, 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
38. Id.
39. E.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903 (2001); Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2001).
40. See Part II, infra.
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many limitations on the exercise of tribal governmental authority, which
are expressed by the Court as "implicit divestitures."'" Although the
Court alone has identified these divestitures, one could argue that the
policymaking branches of the federal government have acquiesced to
them.4" After an amendment recognizing or identifying Indian tribes as
a third sovereign, continued "discovery" of implicit divestitures by the
Court would be less legitimate. However, an amendment that mentions
Indian tribes, but does not express their specific place in Our Federalism
might not affect the outcomes in federal court litigation between states
and Indian tribes that now tend to favor states.43
Part IV analyzes the more likely scenario in which the American
people enact a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in
the United States without mentioning Indian tribes. This Article argues
that such an amendment would not serve to restrict a tribal government's
exercise of its inherent authority to either restrict or authorize same-sex
marriage. Indian tribes already retain undisturbed inherent authority to
decide matters of domestic and family law within Indian Country. 44
Accordingly, tribal governments would be free, even after a constitu-
tional amendment, to enact legislation on same-sex marriage in contra-
vention of that amendment. As a result, some Indian tribes could
become islands of nonconforming law in an area where the American
41. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining "implicit divestiture" as
"that part of sovereignty which the Indian implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status");
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1047, 1053-67 (2005); Bethany R. Berger, "Power over this
Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1957, 2046-49 (2004); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating
Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 371 (1994)
available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/PDF?handle=hein.joumals /aind 19&id=359&print=section
&section= 18&ext=.pdf; Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: A Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 43-48 (1999); Philip
P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 437 n.243 (1993); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional
Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1137, 1160-64 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey, Congressional Intent]; Getches, Conquering, supra
note 32, at 1595-1617; Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's Judicial Reluctance to Allow
Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography ad
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 800-05 (1996); Laurie Reynolds,
"Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court Precedent,
27 N.M. L. REv. 359, 377-80 (1997); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit
Divestiture Doctrine to Implement its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36
TULSA L.J. 267, 270-80 (2000); Dean Suagee, The Supreme Court's "Whack-A-Mole" Game
Theory in Federal Indian Law, a Theory that Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 97-124 (2002).
42. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 459-60.
43. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 FED.
LAW. 38, 39-42 (March/April 2006) [hereinafter Fletcher, Reviving].
44. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
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people appear to have spoken with finality. Federal courts confronted
with the question of whether tribes could become islands of noncon-
forming law would be hard-pressed to either affirm tribal sovereignty or
disclaim foundational federal Indian law. Either way, the result may yet
be the formal and surprising incorporation as a matter of federal consti-
tutional common law of Indian tribes into Our Federalism.
Federal Indian law is already at a constitutional crossroads in other
areas: Whether Congress has authority to overturn Supreme Court deci-
sions relating to implicit divestiture and whether Congress can authorize
Indian tribes to assert criminal or even civil jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers.45 A same-sex marriage amendment, tribal nonconformance, and
the federal or state response to tribal nonconformity could generate yet
another constitutional crisis in federal Indian law.
I. INDIAN TRIBES AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Indian Tribes as an Anomaly in the Constitutional Structure
Indians are mentioned in the Declaration of Independence.46 The
colonists considered the Indians to be brutal savages, threatening the
safety and business interests of the signers of the Declaration, a force
that the king did not repel with sufficient success.47 After the Revolu-
tion, the drafters of the Articles of Confederation still treated Indian
tribes as a powerful force, but chose to treat them as legal entities akin to
foreign nations.48 The Articles granted the federal government exclu-
sive authority to deal with Indian nations.49 Under the Articles' provi-
sion on Indian tribes, state legislatures had undefined authority to
subvert federal actions in the field.5" Before and after the Revolution,
the country's leaders assumed Indian tribes would always remain
outside of the territorial bounds of the United States.5" Any tribes sur-
rounded by American territories and states would have to be assimilated,
45. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or
Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 271 (2003).
46. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776) ("the merciless Indian
Savages...").
47. See Steven Paul McSloy, Border Wars: Haudenosaunee Lands and Federalism, 46 BuFF.
L. REv. 1041,1046-47 (1998); John R. Wunder, "Merciless Indian Savages" and the Declaration
of Independence: Native Americans Translate the Ecunnaunuxulgee Document, 25 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 65, 65-66 (2000-2001).
48. See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1069, 1083-84
(2004) [hereinafter Prakash, Against].
49. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777 art. IX.
50. See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
113, 130-31 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, There Is No].
51. See Prakash, Against, supra note 48, at 1082-83.
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a policy perpetuated in various forms until the latter half of the 20th
century.52
Indians and Indian tribes appear twice in the original text of the
Constitution and once again in the Fourteenth Amendment. The most
critical mention is listed in Congress's enumerated powers under Article
I, Section 8, Clause 3, often referred to as the "Indian Commerce
Clause."53 It seems clear that the Founders intended to retain exclusive
federal authority to deal with the Indian nations, but the Clause does not
expressly state this. 4 This language differs in significant ways from the
language in the Articles. Regardless, the Supreme Court has long
acknowledged that the Indian Commerce Clause bestows exclusive and
plenary power to deal with Indian tribes,56 including the power to legis-
late over Indian tribes.57 But the Founders' apparent intent has been
undermined by a modem parallel debate over the meaning of the Inter-
state Commerce Clause started in large part by former Chief Justice
Rehnquist.58 Some Indian law scholars agree with the originalist skepti-
cism of the extent of federal authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause 59 and further question the moral legitimacy of such broad federal
authority.6°
Manifest Destiny meant that American people in the East would
push Indian tribes to the West. 6 1 At the same time, the federal govern-
52. See COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 75-84.
53. But see AMAR, supra note 30, at 108 (referring to the clause as a "with-and-among"
clause).
54. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian -Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 43
(1996) [hereinafter Frickey, Domesticating].
55. See Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal
Sovereignty, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 641, 656-57 (2003).
56. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Washington v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501(1979); United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S.
363, 367 (1944); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 418 (1849) (Wayne, J.); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 573 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 36 (1831)
(Baldwin, J., concurring).
57. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding Congressional abrogation
of Indian treaty without tribal consent).
58. See Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1061-62 (2001);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address, 41 WILLAME-rrE L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2005); David H.
Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind
Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 320-21 (2001) [hereinafter Getches,
Beyond]; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690
(2004).
59. See Getches, Beyond, supra note 58, at 301.
60. E.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219
(1986).
61. See John Fredericks III, America's First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J. L. & POL'Y 347 366-67 (1999); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine
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ment pursued a policy of "measured separatism" in its treaty-making
policy toward the tribes. 62  Indian Country, once defined as all land
outside the territory of the United States,63 became subsumed over time
into American states and territories. 64 Despite numerous opportunities
to deal with the constitutional problem that Indian tribes posed, espe-
cially during the Reconstruction era, the American people never
amended the Constitution to reflect the existence of Indian tribes within
their borders or express the tribes' situation within the constitutional
scheme of federalism. 66 Indian tribes were no longer foreign nations or
states.67 Indian Country was not an American territory, a term of art
contemplated by the Constitution. 68  Indian Country was not like the
District of Columbia, nor was Indian Country like Puerto Rico.7"
Indian tribes, Indian Country, and federal Indian law were and are sui
generis - "extraconstitutional."71
The Constitution contains two references to Indians as individuals,
both of which are now considered atavistic and meaningless in the mod-
em era. Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3 provides that "Indians not
taxed" cannot be included in counting the American population for pur-
poses of representation in Congress and the Electoral College.72 The
Fourteenth Amendment includes identical language.73 Here, it appears
the Founders assumed that some individual Indians could reside in areas
of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 112 (2006) [hereinafter Miller,
Doctrine].
62. See WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 11, at 4.
63. See Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within
Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 55, 70-71 (1998).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949); Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and
the Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 425, 440
(1998).
65. See EFFECT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ON INDIAN TRIBES, S. Rep. No. 41-268
(1870).
66. See Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows, supra note 29, at 756-57.
67. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)..
68. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 129 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
69. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
70. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 59-65 (1990) (discussing the so-called
"Insular Cases").
71. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 213 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Sarah H.
Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25 (2002); Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of
Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 776 (1993).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
73. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
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within the American borders, but not become citizens or be subject to
taxation by federal or state governments.74 Since 1924, all Indians born
within the United States are American citizens, regardless of whether
they choose to be citizens.75 As American citizens, they are subject to
federal taxation in general, although they may retain numerous state and
local tax immunities.76 The 1924 Act appears to have eliminated all
significance to the "Indians not taxed" language.77
In a constitutional sense, Indian tribes are an anomaly.78 The text
does not appear to recognize tribal sovereignty except in an implicit
fashion, although the evidence of that recognition is as close to conclu-
sive as possible.7 9 But while Indian tribes retain sovereign authority,
their members maintain three types of citizenship simultaneously: tribal,
American, and state citizenship.80 Thus, while American Indian citizens
have the benefit of federal and state constitutional rights protections,
such as those included in the Bill of Rights, they also have the benefit of
any rights protected under their tribal Constitution.8
This stands in marked contrast, even irony, to the fact that constitu-
tional rights protections do not limit the exercise of tribal governmental
authority. 82 For example, the Supreme Court has held that where one
Cherokee Indian murders another Cherokee Indian within the jurisdic-
tion of the Cherokee nation, this is not an offense against the United
States, but rather only an offense against the local laws of the Cherokee
nation.83 A vast number of Indian tribes, as history shows, were foreign
nations84 (except to the most skeptical Founders or significant contem-
74. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); AMAR, supra note 30, at 439 n. *; see also id.
(citing Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27).
75. See generally Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the
Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon
Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETrER L. J. 107 (1999).
76. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 225 n.161 (1984) (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
77. See Porter, supra note 75, at 123-28.
78. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 213 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing
Indian tribes as "extraconstitutional sovereign[s]"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 27-28
(Johnson, J., dissenting) ("anomaly"); Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 54, at 34 ("anomaly");
Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779,
807-08 (2006) ("extraconstitutional").
79. See generally Clinton, There Is No, supra note 50.
80. See Tebben, supra note 29, at 346-47.
81. See Angela R. Riley, Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
82. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
83. Id.
84. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 50-74 (1831) (Thompson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state as late as 1831); Joseph C. Burke, The
Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 514 (1969).
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poraries85) during the time of the Founding86 and even during the time
of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.87 Tribes predate the
Constitution with a sovereignty that existed "from time immemorial. 88
Tribal leaders did not negotiate or execute any of the provisions of the
Constitution, and, as a result of the peculiar Lockean notion of the con-
sent of the governed, legal authorities agree that the Constitution does
not apply to Indian tribes.89 Specific examples of this exemption
include the fact that Indian tribes were free to disregard Anglo-American
concepts of "due process" and "equal protection"9 until Congress inter-
jected a version of the Bill of Rights into Indian Country in 1968.9'
Indian people are not constitutionally guaranteed a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment in tribal courts.92 Indian people are not constitu-
tionally guaranteed a right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments in tribal courts.93 As a practical matter, Indian tribes generally
85. See Cherokee Nation at 31-50 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (arguing that the Cherokee Nation
retained no sovereignty in 1831); Burke, supra note 84, at 515 (discussing Justice Baldwin's
opinion in Cherokee Nation).
86. See Prakash, Against, supra note 48, at 1107 ("As far as the intentions of the
Constitution's Founders (both the Framers and the Ratifiers), there is no evidence that any of them
sought to have the Constitution protect Indian tribes.").
87. See Clinton, There Is No, supra note 50, at 145-46 (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94
(1884)).
88. McClahanan v. State Tax Commission of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("It must
always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign
nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government."); see
Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985); United States v.
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 359 (1941); Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 272 U.S. 351, 356 (1926); Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 62 (1906); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian
Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 906 (2000); Daniel Kelly, Note, Indian Title: The Rights of American
Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655 (1975).
89. See Clinton, There Is No, supra note 50, at 162; Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the
Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841, 847 (1990); Richard Collins, Indian Consent to
American Government, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 365 (1989); Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The
Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts Over Nonmember Indians: An Examination of the Basic
Framework on Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and After Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. BAR NEWS &
J. 70, 74 (1991); Frank Pommersheim, Democracy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy: Some
Initial Thoughts, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457, 461 (1997); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty
and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1991) (footnote omitted); David Williams, Legitimation
and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA.
L. REV. 403, 478-79 (1994).
90. See Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe of S. Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1957).
91. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006).
92. See Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration of Tribal
Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 42 n. 103 (2004) [hereinafter Clinton, Comity]; Kevin
J. Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective on
Congressional Authority to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REV. 65, 85 n.96
(1990) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n.14 (1978)).
93. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 361 n.124 (2004).
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provide these guarantees in accordance with tribal constitutional, statu-
tory, or common law,9 4 but they cannot be required to do so by the
American Constitution. In addition, the Establishment Clause does not
serve to prohibit the theocratic governments of the desert southwest
tribes and Pueblos,95 a result that is both a question of governmental
structure and individual rights. In short, measured separatism provided
Indian tribes a place in Our Federalism to make their own laws and be
governed by them.96
B. The Supreme Court's Resulting Distrust of Tribal Governments
For the Supreme Court, the exercise of sovereign authority by a
governmental entity in the United States should derive from either the
federal government or the states.97 The federal government and the
states entered into the compact known as the Constitution and, as such,
are the only obvious legitimate outlets of governmental authority.98 As
the Constitution states and as the Founders intended, in general, the fed-
eral government controls foreign and interstate questions, 99 while states
handle their own internal and local affairs. 100 It would seem that since
Indian tribes are now located within the borders of the states, state law
would control their destiny.
But federal Indian law, derived in large part from the Indian Com-
merce Clause,10 1 treaties with Indian tribes, 102 and a "preconstitutional"
94. E.g., CONST. OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTrAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS Art. X,
§ 1 (1988), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/GTBcons3.html; Turtle Mountain
Judicial Board v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, No. 04-007 (Turtle Mountain
Appellate Court 2005), available at http://www.turtle-mountain.cc.nd.us/cases.htm; Clinton,
Comity, supra note 92, at 42 n.103.
95. See Robert Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 68 N.D. L. REv. 657, 665 (1992); Valencia-Weber, supra note 92, at 361-62.
96. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 11; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222
(1959).
97. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542-43 (1976) (federal authority over state
authority); Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939) (federal authority); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 34 (1849) (state authority).
98. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 570-71 (1832), superseded by statute, 43 U.S.C.S.
§ 666, 66 Stat. 549, as recognized in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
99. See AMAR, supra note 30, at 107-08; Saikrishna Prakash, The Three Commerce Clauses
and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1166 (2003). E.g.,
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206-07 (2005) (citing Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill
(1942)); Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REv. 695, 701-
06 (1996).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
101. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
102. See, 541 U.S. at 200; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-566 (1903); Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305 (1902).
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federal authority to deal with Indian tribes,1"3 compels the opposite
result. States have, as a general matter, no authority over reservation
Indians." ° The federal government continues a long-standing "trust
relationship" with Indian tribes and Indian people, forming part of its
special political relationship with both Indian tribes and individual Indi-
ans.10 5 Indian treaties, unless abrogated by an express Act of Congress,
remain in full force, even though the (indirect, third-party) beneficiaries
often are American citizens who happen to be Indian people. 106 Finally,
inherent tribal governmental authority remains intact unless divested by
express action of Congress or some other divestiture. 1°7 For example,
Indian tribes retain immunity from suit even by a state in federal, state,
and tribal courts.'0 8 This is a significant sovereignty.
But tribes are not states and they have no Tenth or Eleventh
Amendment to guard them from federal or state intrusion in their affairs.
From the very earliest pronouncement of the foundational principles of
federal Indian law, the Marshall Trilogy,'0 9 and the even earlier congres-
sional pronouncements of federal Indian law and policy, the
103. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
315-22 (1936); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557; other citations omitted).
104. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-222 (1959);
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 517 (1831); Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27
CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1179-81 (1995); Mike McBride, III, Oklahoma's Civil-Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction over Indian Activities in Indian Country: A Critical Commentary on Lewis v. Sac &
Fox Tribe Housing Authority, 19 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 81, 120-21 (1994); G. William Rice,
Employment in Indian Country: Considerations Respecting Tribal Regulation of the Employer-
Employee Relationship, 72 N.D. L. REV. 267, 269 (1996).
105. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases:
Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1108-1109 (2005); Rodina
Cave, Comment, Simplifying the Indian Trust Responsibility, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1399 (2000);
Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism
Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 802-06 (2001); Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian
Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 635 (1982); Angela R. Riley, Indian
Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement under the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 74 (2002); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247
(2003).
106. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999);
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979);
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
107. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 174 n.24 (1982) (quoting Earl
Mettler, A Unified Theory of Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 89, 97 (1978)); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 13, 323 (1978).
108. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-56 (1998); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991).
109. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the
Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006), draft available at http://papers.ssm.com
sol3/papers.cfm? abstractid=924547.
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Nonintercourse Acts," 10 tribal authority has been subject to both explicit
and implicit divestiture without consent.I" Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits Congress or the Supreme Court from winnowing down tribal
governmental powers, or even relegating individual Indians to a status
(some might say) below that of non-Indian American citizens, such as in
the area of criminal jurisdiction." 2 To this day, Congress retains incred-
ible authority to regulate Indian tribes, as long as their enactments meet
the rational basis test. 1 3 And Congress has done so, both to the advan-
tage and disadvantage of Indian tribes and individual Indians.' 1 But
Congress alone cannot amend the Constitution.
In the end, the Supreme Court decides what the Constitution
means.' "  Although the Court granted almost unlimited deference to
Congress when it made positive law in the field," 6 where Congress has
been silent or vague, the Court has taken the lead as both constitutional
interpreter and, according to many legal authorities, national federal
Indian policymaker.' 'I The Rehnquist Court's pronouncements on fed-
eral Indian law have been both bold and "ruthlessly pragmatic.""' 8
While Congress appears to have acquiesced to all but a few decisions,
the Court maintained a sort of "judicial plenary power." 9 The Court's
decisions in cases where tribal authority conflicted with state or local
110. See City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1484 (2005)
("In 1790, Congress passed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, commonly known as the
Nonintercourse Act. Periodically renewed and remaining substantially in force today, the Act bars
sales of tribal land without the acquiescence of the Federal Government." (citations omitted)).
11l. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 325-26 (listing examples of divestitures of tribal inherent
authority).
112. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
113. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977); Pommersheim, Is There, supra note 45, at 271 n.4; Comment,
Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235
(1982).
114. Compare Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding Congress's
abrogation of Indian treaties in favor of the General Allotment Act), with United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004) (upholding Congressional reaffirmation of tribal inherent authority to
prosecute nonmember Indians).
115. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803).
116. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); Board of Comm'rs of Creek
County v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 718-19 (1943); Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 311 (1911).
117. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 454; Getches, Beyond,
supra note 58, at 357; David E. Wilkins, The Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of 'Implied Repeals:'
A Requiem for Indigenous Treaty Rights, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4 (1989).
118. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 460.
119. See Clinton, Comity, supra note 92, at 62; Clinton, There Is No, supra note 50, at 259;
Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows, supra note 29, at 751; Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A
Constitutional Crisis in Indian Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 304 (2003-2004);
Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a
Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 328 (1991); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The
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authority; 2 ' where tribal authority conflicted with nonmembers' indi-
vidual rights; 2' and where individual Indians sought any relief whatso-
ever, ' have overwhelmingly favored non-Indian interests. 2 3  These
results turn the foundation of federal Indian law on its head, but given
the political ideology of the Rehnquist Court, these results are unsurpris-
ing. 124 Whether a decision could be found to be a result of an originalist
Court,125 a strict constructionist Court, 1 2 6 an activist Court, 127 or a tenta-
tive and minimalist Court, 28 the fact that the Constitution does not
incorporate Indian tribes implies that the Roberts Court also will be
reluctant to value tribal governmental interests over state or federal
interests or nonmember interests.' 29  Moreover, the members of the
Court know they are not constrained by constitutional provisions in
deciding their Indian cases as they believe matters ought to be.
1 30
Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the
Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 412 (2003).
120. E.g., City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 125 S. Ct. 1478 (2005);
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
121. E.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
122. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
123. See Getches, Beyond, supra note 58, at 279-81.
124. See John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young,
Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. Sr. L.
REV. 787, 902-03 (1999) ("In effectively promoting the compulsory propagation of 'the State's
own rules and traditions' within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, the Kennedy/Rehnquist
opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe illustrates the Rehnquist Court's signatory tendency to adjudicate
disputes implicating both state and tribal interests in disregard of fundamental tenets of federal
Indian law, in order to 'enrich' the States at the expense of the Tribes."). See generally Getches,
Beyond, supra note 58; Getches, Conquering, supra note 32; Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie
Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1995).
125. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
126. See Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REv. 77, 100-01
(1985) ("Terms such as 'strict construction,' an 'activist court,' or 'judicial restraint' cease to have
meaning when used by opponents of equality who were never committed to abstract principles,
but only to preserving segregation at any cost.").
127. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 170-71 (1984) (accusing the Burger Court of
judicial activism).
128. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001).
129. See Bruce Bothelo, Mayor of Juneau, Alaska and former Alaska Attorney General,
Address before the Federal Bar Association's Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque, NM (April 6,
2006) (asserting that Chief Justice Roberts will not be sympathetic to tribal interests). Cf
generally Cass R. Sunstein, John Roberts, Minimalist: He's Conservative, but He's No
Fundamentalist, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2005, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/
feature.html?id= 110007208.
130. See Getches, Conquering, supra note 32, at 1575 ("[O]pinions in this field have not
posited an original state of affairs that can subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation, but
have rather sought to discern what the current state of affairs ought to be by taking into account all
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II. THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE AND INDIAN COUNTRY
Same-sex marriage became a national policy issue after the Court
decided Lawrence v. Texas,' 3' striking down anti-sodomy laws that
applied to gay and lesbian persons and no others because these laws
violated their right to privacy as protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' 32 In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, the
Court seemed to be recognizing that if sex between members of the
same sex could not be criminalized, then it made sense to many that
discriminatory bans on same-sex marriage should be struck down as
well. 33 In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided
Goodrich v. Department of Public Health, 34 finding on the basis of
both federal and state constitutional law that the state law ban on same-
sex marriage was unconstitutional.1 35 In the following year, a large
swath of states enacted via public referendum amendments to their state
constitutions that banned same-sex marriage.136 Nebraska's ban, more
severe than many others, 37 was struck down by the federal district
court.' 38 The Eighth Circuit reversed on July 14, 2006, holding the ban
legislation, and the congressional 'expectations' that it reflects, down to the present day.")
(quoting Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., (Apr. 4,
1990) (Duro v. Reina, No. 88-6546), in Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (reproduced from the
Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)). Cf. Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 467 ("Justice Kennedy's line of reasoning exemplifies the root
problem in federal Indian law. The place of federal Indian law in American public law can be
understood by imagining layers of law, with American constitutionalism built on top of American
colonialism. Above the colonial line, America has what amounts to a civil religion of
constitutionalism. Justice Kennedy is one of many believers who have in the Constitution a 'faith
[that] is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' This constitutional
faith may be crushed when the eye drifts below the colonial line, which is presumably one reason
why most eyes never venture that far. I say 'may be' rather than 'is' because a true believer like
Justice Kennedy might respond to the problem not by a loss of faith, but by a call to missionary
work. For in both Duro and his separate opinion in Lara, Justice Kennedy has sought to bring our
civil religion to Indian country.") (quoting Hebrews 11:1 (King James)).
131. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
132. See id. at 578-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor would have struck down
the statute on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause and also would not have
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003). Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. See id. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
134. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
135. See id. at 959-61.
136. See Amy Miller, Marriage Equality v. The Defense of Marriage Acts, Address at Helen
Hamilton Day, University of North Dakota School of Law (March 31, 2006) (videotape on file
with author).
137. See id.
138. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc., v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005), rev'd,
455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
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to be constitutional. 139
After Goodrich in 2004, two Cherokee women walked into the
Cherokee tribal court and applied for a marriage license. 4 ' The Chero-
kee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal dismissed two challenges to their
application on the grounds that the challengers lacked standing because
they had not suffered an injury. 4 ' Meanwhile, the Navajo Nation's leg-
islature enacted the Dine Marriage Act, which banned same-sex
marriage. 142
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), 4 3 creating an exception to the full faith and credit doctrine
allowing state courts to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage legal in
another state or jurisdiction."4 The statute incorporated Indian tribes
into the mix as a third sovereign, authorizing tribal courts to have the
same ability as state courts to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage
from an outside jurisdiction. 14 DOMA allows, however, that if a tribe
authorizes or recognizes same-sex marriage, states and other tribes have
no obligation to recognize that decision. 4 6 Under current law, tribes
may become an island of same-sex marriage, although, given the debates
in Cherokee and Navajo country, it might never happen.
DOMA is a powerful statute, but it may suffer from the same con-
stitutional infirmities as many state laws banning or restricting same-sex
marriage. Legal commentators suggest that DOMA is unconstitutional
under several constitutional provisions. 147  Members of Congress and
President Bush contend that the clear solution is to adopt a constitutional
139. See id., rev'd, 455 F. 3d. 859 (D. Neb. 2006), rehearing denied en banc, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22372 (D. Neb. 2006).
140. See S. E. Ruckman, Third Challenge Filed to Tribal Same-Sex Marriage: A Cherokee
Nation Court Administrator Says She Would Be Violating Tribal Law if She Filed a Lesbian
Couple's Marriage Certificate, TULSA WORLD, March 4, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
3684250.
141. See JAT Dismisses Same-Sex Marriage Injunction, CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIAN
ADVOCATE, Feb. 1, 2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 6759034.
142. See Gay Marriage Ban Polarizes Views; Council Rejects Shirley Veto of Gay Marriage
Ban, Opposing Sides Remain Firm in Pro and Con Positions, NAVAJO TIMES, June 9, 2005, at
Al0, available at 2005 WLNR 11935955.
143. See Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at I U.S.C. § 7, 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). The text of this provision is as follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. E.g., James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist
Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335 (1997); Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the
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amendment that would ban same-sex marriage once and for all. 148 It
does not appear at this writing that such an amendment will pass any
time soon, but such an amendment remains a possibility.
The various proposals focus more on the exact character of the ban
rather than the jurisdictional questions. In national politics, where
Indian tribes are not represented E,,t all and Indian people are an under-
represented and statistically insignificant minority, forgetting the third
sovereign is endemic.149 Regardless, in the case of a same-sex marriage
amendment, either including or excluding Indian tribes raises significant
constitutional questions and implications, as the following section
shows.
III. IMPLICIT INCORPORATION OF INDIAN TRIBES INTO THE
CONSTITUTION THROUGH A SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
A constitutional amendment prohibiting or authorizing same-sex
marriage in the United States and its territories - and including Indian
Country - could have the concomitant impact of creating implicit recog-
nition of modem Indian tribes in the Constitution and Our Federalism.
A marriage amendment either prohibiting Indian tribes from authorizing
or recognizing same-sex marriage or restricting Indian tribes from ban-
ning same-sex marriage, listing Indian tribes among the federal govern-
ment and the states, would be implicit recognition and slight
modification of no fewer than four Indian law doctrines and the possible
creation of a fifth: (1) Indian tribes are sovereigns, with inherent author-
ity over domestic relations; 5 ' (2) Indian tribes (somehow) are part of
Our Federalism, even if they are not states or other entities;'' (3) state
Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419
(1999).
148. See Krotoszynski & Spitko, supra note 25, at 602-03.
149. E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d
1071 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act's silence as to Indian
tribes meant that it did not apply to the tribes); State of Wash., Dept. of Ecology v. United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 was silent as to Indian tribes).
150. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916); COHEN, supra note 10,
§ 4.01[2][c], at 215.
151. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33
TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997) ("Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign entities-
the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes. Each of the three sovereigns has its own
judicial system, and each plays an important role in the administration of justice in this country.").
See generally Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship
Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25
U. TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994); Skibine, Imperfect Notion, supra note 41.
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laws do not apply in Indian Country, in general; 52 (4) Indian tribes are
not subject to the Constitution's limits or mandates; 53 and (5) the
remainder of the Constitution's limitations on federal and state govern-
mental power do not, by negative inference, apply to Indian tribes.
First, a marriage amendment including Indian tribes would be rec-
ognition that they are the third sovereign. The Indian Commerce Clause
lists Indian tribes along with states and foreign nations.154 The Supreme
Court, however, has never recognized Indian tribes to be equivalent to
foreign nations, let alone states (although the Court once came close 5 1).
Nevertheless, the Founders wrote that clause with the understanding that
Indian tribes would remain outside the borders of the United States, with
no serious discussion or expectation that the tribes would survive being
surrounded by the states. 156 A constitutional amendment restating, in a
way, the constitutional place of Indian tribes in the 21st century would
be modern constitutional recognition of the place that Indian tribes hold
in practice. And in the domestic and family law context, Indian tribes'
authority would not be subject to questioning.
Second, a marriage amendment mentioning Indian tribes would
constitute an implicit incorporation of Indian tribes into Our Federalism.
Indian tribes now have a place in Our Federalism, but that place exists at
the sufferance of Congress, and, to a greater extent, the Supreme
Court.'57 For example, Congress, in the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act,' 58 placed Indian tribes in the governmental scheme along with the
states and the federal government.' 59 But Congress's policy toward
Indian tribes can change, as it often has, to a policy of assimilation of
Indian people or even termination of Indian tribal government struc-
tures.1 60 In addition, the Court, with its apparent eye toward judicial
supremacy, may one day terminate tribal sovereignty in its entirety.
152. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987); Bryan v.
Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 376 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-22 (1959);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 517 (1832); COHEN, supra note 10, §§ 6.01[1]-[2], at 499-506.
153. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church of N. Am. v. Navajo
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
154. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
155. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1831) (recognizing Indians as
"domestic dependent nations" but not as foreign nations).
156. See WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 11, at 103.
157. See United States v. Lara, 294 F.3d 1004, 1007-09 (8th Cir. 2002) (Hansen, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress may delegate new powers to tribes as a matter of federal common law but
it may do so only under constitutional constraints), rev'd, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 541
U.S. 193 (2004).
158. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988).
159. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2001) (creating a complex schema where Indian tribes, states, and
federal government authorize certain forms of Indian gaming through a compacting process).
160. See generally COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 75-84.
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Both of these results appear to be unrealistic, for both practical and
political reasons,' 6 1 but they are not impossible. A marriage amendment
including Indian tribes brings tribes into the formal constitutional struc-
ture. It would be untheorized and haphazard, but it would be
undeniable.
Third, inclusion of Indian tribes in a marriage amendment would
represent an understanding that state law has no force in Indian Country.
Inclusion of Indian tribes in the amendment would be necessary only
because state laws cannot reach Indian Country. This principle, which
Justice Marshall referred to as a "platonic notion," derives from the very
early case of Worcester v. Georgia.161 Worcester was less an Indian
law case than a states' rights case 163 and Chief Justice Marshall carved
out an exception to state authority to legislate over Indian tribes and
Indian people in Indian Country. 164  The Rehnquist Court backtracked
and turned the Worcester presumption upside down when it asserted in
dicta that state laws do apply as a presumptive matter in Indian Coun-
try.' 65 But the reality of Indian Country is that state and local govern-
ments, in general, do not want jurisdiction over Indian Country because
they wish to avoid the issue.166 Moreover, in many areas, non-Indian
governments and non-Indian people rely on tribes for jobs, police pro-
tection, environmental protection, and other governmental and economic
services. 6  Thus, the Worcester rule, disfavored by the current Court,
retains de facto legitimacy in Indian Country. A marriage amendment
161. See Joseph William Singer, Double Bind: Indian Nations v. The Supreme Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/
dec05/singer.pdf:
The Court cannot seem to live with Indian nations; those nations do not fit easily
into the constitutional structure and their place in the federal system seems obscure
and anomalous. Yet the Supreme Court cannot live without them either; much as
the Court would like to limit tribal sovereignty, it is neither equipped nor inclined to
erase tribal sovereignty entirely. Indian nations are not only mentioned in the
Constitution, but are also the subject of an entire Title of the United States Code.
162. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima, 502 U.S. 251, 257
(1992); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 515 (1832).
163. See Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 9
(2005).
164. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557, 561.
165. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001).
166. E.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 159 (1999) (describing how state and local law enforcement
rely on tribal courts). See Fletcher, Reviving, supra note 43, at 41-42.
167. E.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, Betting on Their Future, A.B.A. J., May 2006, at 32, 36
("For the state, it's a sweet deal. It doesn't have to make any concessions or put up any money to
get a large new tax base. At Quil Ceda, for example, all the utility work for roads, sewers, water
lines, electricity, etc., was paid for by the tribes. The Tulalips even contributed money for work
on a new interchange from the interstate, which also benefits nearby communities. The tribes also
hire, train and pay for their own police force.").
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would cement that understanding and create a larger barrier to the
Court's tendency to puncture the "platonic notion. 168
Fourth, a marriage amendment limiting tribal government activities
to recognize or prohibit same-sex marriage establishes the federal and
state government understanding that the Constitution includes some pro-
visions that apply to Indian tribes. Part of the incorporation of Indian
tribes into the Constitution and the federal system is the side-effect (for
tribes) of being subject to some mandates of that document. Indian
tribes did not participate as sovereigns at the table during the Founding
or any of the Constitution's amendments. They would probably also be
excluded (without bad faith) from the negotiations and later ratification
of a marriage amendment.
A marriage amendment attempting to alter the inherent authority of
Indian tribes to recognize or restrict same-sex marriage would cut into
the undisturbed authority of Indians to make their own laws and be gov-
erned by them. It is conceivable and realistic to assume that tribes may
resist application of this amendment to them. Moreover, some Indian
tribes may take the view that the United States cannot incorporate tribes
into the Constitution without consent from each of the over 560 tribes. 169
This Article will not seek to answer these questions as they are outside
the scope of discussion. The Article does assume, however, that the
amendment would be successful in binding Indian tribes to its mandate.
Indian tribes have acquiesced to federal authority for so long that to
reject an amendment at this point could be fruitless.17°
Fifth, inclusion of Indian tribes in a marriage amendment - and in
no other place in the Constitution except the Commerce Clause - would
mean by negative implication that the remaining provisions of the docu-
ment do not apply to Indian tribes. For instance, the Bill of Rights does
not limit tribal governmental authority and a marriage amendment
would not alter that result.17" ' The rest of the Constitution excludes
Indian tribes, for example, from sending representatives to Congress and
168. See McClanahan v, State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Laurence,
Symmetry, supra note 89, at 890.
169. Thanks to Kirsten Carlson for reminding the author of this possibility.
170. See generally Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its
Development and How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 148 (1997) (arguing that Indian tribes signing treaties ceding land in
exchange for federal protection acquiesced to federal authority). Cf generally Deloria & Newton,
supra note 89, at 74 ("To round out what looks like a parade of horribles, the Court could also
choose a case challenging the amendments as an opportunity to limit congressional power to
members of federally recognized Indian tribes. If Congress were to acquiesce to a limitation of its
power to enrolled Indians, its acquiescence would unweave the complex fabric of federal
jurisdiction and control in Indian country.").
171. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896); Native American Church of N. Am. v.
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th Cir. 1959).
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the Electoral College.1 72 If an amendment were passed, tribes would
remain outside the structure of the federal-state relationship, but would
be part of the overall structure. Even under the overall structure, how-
ever, tribes would have very limited duties and responsibilities com-
pared to states and the federal government. Incorporation of Indian
tribes into the Constitution through a marriage amendment would serve
to bind Indian tribes (if at all) to that provision and that provision only.
These modifications would go a long way toward answering ques-
tions posed by some Justices. Two fundamental questions remain open
in the Roberts Court. First, Justice Thomas appears to be a leader in
questioning whether tribes should retain sovereignty at all, in large part
because tribes are neither full sovereigns nor have a place in the United
States Constitution. He has made two statements in relation to this ques-
tion: "The tribes, [in] contrast [to States and the federal government], are
not part of this constitutional order, and their sovereignty is not guaran-
teed by it[;]"17 3 and "[i]t is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty not
to exist merely at the whim of an external government."' 74 Second, a
corollary and resulting question is whether Indian tribes can exercise -
or whether Congress can authorize Indian tribes to exercise - jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers outside of the bounds of the individual rights
protections contained in the Constitution. Justice Kennedy appears to be
a leader in raising this question. He wrote, "[t]o hold that Congress can
subject [a nonmember American citizen], within our domestic borders,
to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution is a seri-
ous step."' 175
A marriage amendment incorporating Indian tribes into its provi-
sions raises significant questions and, in all likelihood, may signify rec-
ognition of the American people that Indian tribes are a part of Our
Federalism. At the founding of the Republic, Indian tribes were the
unknown, outsider presence beyond the borders of the fledgling United
States. As Manifest Destiny made its way west and swallowed all of the
remains of Indian Country," 6 federal policy changed toward assimila-
172. See Clinton, There Is No, supra note 29, at 258.
173. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMELANCES
OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 114-19 (2002)
(restating Justice Kennedy's approach; discussing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)); Frickey,
(Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 465-66 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's
approach).
176. See generally Miller, Doctrine, supra note 61, at 117-18 (explaining how the Doctrine of
Discovery was applied by European-Americans to legally infringe on the real property and
sovereign rights of American Indians).
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tion and, in some cases, extermination.' 77 Indian tribes survived, and in
1934, Congress repudiated the efforts to stamp out Indian sovereignty by
enacting the Indian Reorganization Act.'78 Still, as Justice Thomas
stated, tribal sovereignty could be argued to exist at the sufferance of
Congress (although one thing American history shows is that Indian
tribes do not disappear even when "terminated"' 79). A marriage amend-
ment including Indian tribes would recognize in the Constitution what
the federal government has recognized since 1934 - that Indian tribes
are sovereign entities and are part of Our Federalism. Of course, the
amendment alone would not define the rights and responsibilities of
Indian tribes, states, and the federal government in relation to each. If
the amendment does nothing more than constitutionally codify the cur-
rent state of affairs, such a result would still be a benefit to Indian tribes.
While the extent of tribal authority will remain a question for the Court
to ponder over and over again, no longer could anyone argue with
authority that Indian tribes existed at the sufferance of another
sovereign. 180
The formal (if implicit) incorporation of Indian tribes into the Con-
stitution may answer Justice Kennedy's concern as well. Indian tribes
would be part of the Constitution, albeit in an undefined manner. Justice
Kennedy's theory that no non-member consented to the jurisdiction of
Indian tribes, even in the Lockean sense of the consent of the gov-
erned, 81 would no longer have persuasive value the moment that the
American people ratify a constitutional amendment that presumes the
presence of Indian tribes in the constitutional system of Our Federalism.
There would be no Tenth Amendment-type provision precluding the
Supreme Court or Congress from limiting the authority of Indian tribes,
but neither would there be the blank check of judicial supremacy in
Indian law.
177. See COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 75-84.
178. Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§461-79
(1934)).
179. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS 71-75, 82, 182-89 (2005) (describing recovery of Menominee tribe after being
terminated by Congress).
180. One initial question that will confound constitutional law experts after an amendment
including Indian tribes would be how to decide which Indian tribes would be included. There are
over 560 federally-recognized Indian tribes, but these tribes are recognized either by the Secretary
of Interior in an administrative process or through Acts of Congress. See generally Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Commentary, Politics, History, and Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian
Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487, 491-492 (book review). Could any employee of the Department of
Interior have authority to decide monumental constitutional questions? Could Congress, for that
matter? Can the American people incorporate Indian tribes into the Constitution without asking
for consent? Alas, these hard questions remain outside the scope of this Article.
181. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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In sum, amending the Constitution to prevent Indian tribes from
recognizing or prohibiting same-sex marriage creates an unusual solu-
tion to an unusual problem. The practical existence of Indian tribes as a
third sovereign could be linked to a constitutional provision that recog-
nizes that existence. Many of the arguments made by opponents of tri-
bal governmental authority point to the fact that the Constitution does
nothing to either protect or authorize tribal authority. A marriage
amendment in this vein eliminates this line of argument. But, in reality,
it is not certain or even probable that a marriage amendment would
include Indian tribes. The final part of this Article discusses the impact
of a same-sex marriage amendment that is silent as to Indian tribes.
IV. IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF INDIAN TRIBES IN THE CONSTITUTION
THROUGH SILENCE
A same-sex marriage amendment that does not mention Indian
tribes poses a very serious question for tribal advocates and leaders and,
depending on how tribes react, to the Supreme Court. Indian tribes
would have a few options. First, tribes could conform to the amend-
ment, as many tribes would anyway. Second, tribes could rely upon the
Worcester rule and flaunt the amendment by authorizing same-sex mar-
riage. It is the second possibility that creates the interesting and even
dangerous question for tribes. Part IV.A. and Part IV.B. analyze two
theories under which the amendment could be construed to apply to
Indian tribes - either under federal authority or state authority. Part
IV.C. investigates the ramifications of this dispute on Our Federalism
and proposes one possible outcome that would represent the implicit
incorporation of Indian tribes as a constitutional entity.
A. Federal Authority over Indian Tribes
As a general matter, the individual rights provisions in the Consti-
tution do not apply to Indian tribes, but there may be one exception and,
in the coming years of the Roberts Court, there may be others. Talton v.
Mayes and its progeny made clear that the Constitution's limitations on
governments to affect the rights of citizens do not apply to Indian
tribes.' 82 As established earlier, tribes predate the Constitution and did
not consent to its strictures. 8 3 The lone exception, if it could be called
that, is the question of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which set the vot-
ing age at 18. In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus,'84 the question
182. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896); Native American Church of N. Am. v.
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th Cir. 1959).
183. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
184. 566 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
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presented was whether the Twenty-Sixth Amendment applied to a tribal
election on an amendment to the tribal constitution conducted by the
Secretary of Interior.' 85 Many tribal constitutions adopted after the
Indian Reorganization Act in 1934 were "boilerplate" constitutions con-
taining similar provisions and structures. 86 One feature of these "model
IRA constitutions" was the secretarial election, whereby the Secretary of
Interior held and supervised elections on amendments to the tribal con-
stitution. 187 The Secretary promulgated departmental regulations for the
specific purpose of implementing these tribal constitutions.' 88 As a
result, the Eighth Circuit found in the case of the Cheyenne River Sioux
elections that the election was tinged with enough federal authority so as
to become a quasi-federal election subject to the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment. 189 It is not clear at all why an election to amend a tribal constitu-
tion, regardless of which handholding agency conducts the mechanics of
the election, should be subject to a federal constitutional restriction. No
federal interest, other than a vague, amorphous interest in what tribes do,
is implicated. One suspects that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe deci-
sion would not withstand serious scrutiny, especially after Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez.190 In the latter case, the Supreme Court held that
federal courts do not have jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought
under the Indian Civil Rights Act. 191 Thus, the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment - only in the very narrow circumstances where the Secretary is
conducting the election - applies to Indian tribes. The remainder of the
Constitution, dealing with the protection of individual rights, is not
applicable.
Would an amendment of general applicability apply to Indian
tribes? The Supreme Court has not taken up this specific question but
lower federal courts are now split on the issue of whether federal statutes
of general applicability apply to Indian tribes. 92 Under the Cohen for-
mulation of tribal sovereignty, 193 approved by the Court as late as
1978,19' federal statutes do not apply to Indian tribes unless they
185. See Andrus, 566 F.2d at 1087-88.
186. Timothy W. Joranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian Self-Determination at Bay:
Secretarial Authority to Disapprove Tribal Constitutional Amendments, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 81, 92
(1993-1994).
187. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 566 F.2d at 1087-88.
188. See 25 C.F.R. Part 81.
189. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 566 F.2d at 1089.
190. 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978).
191. Id. at 58-59 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1303).
192. See Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV.
691, 691, 695-96 (2004) [hereinafter Singel, Labor Relations].
193. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 122.
194. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (quoting COHEN, supra note
10, at 122); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting COHEN, supra note 10, at
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expressly include Indian tribes in their provisions. The lower federal
courts have handled a few dozen of these questions and, in many of the
cases, found that a statute of general applicability will apply to Indian
tribes.'95 The courts have adopted several amorphous tests to reach this
conclusion, but one area where they agree is that a statute of general
applicability will not apply to Indian tribes where the statute affects a
tribe's internal, domestic affairs.' 96 This is a test created by the federal
courts as a matter of federal common law. However, the result is that
the hard inner core of tribal sovereignty remains the Williams v. Lee
formulation that Indians have the right to make their own laws and be
governed by them.' 97 At the center of this core are domestic relations
and family law.' 98
Here is where the marriage amendment and federal Indian law
could meet head on. After a marriage amendment purporting to ban all
same-sex marriages in the United States, imagine an Indian tribe, for
example, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians,
amending its marriage code to allow for marriages between same-sex
couples.' 99 Perhaps the Band's tribal court then presides over the mar-
riages of several same-sex couples - tribal members, nonmember Indi-
ans, non-Indians, and maybe even foreign nationals 200 - and attracts the
attention of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Mich-
igan. The U.S. Attorney may then choose to bring an action seeking an
injunction against the Band and its court from authorizing any other
same-sex marriages and request a declaratory judgment that the mar-
riage amendment applies to the Band.
Foundational principles of federal Indian law20 1 suggest that the
marriage amendment could not restrict the tribe's government authority
in this area. The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the Twenty-Sixth
122); Robert A. Williams, The Hermeneutics of Indian Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1012, 1020 (1987)
(reviewing WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note I1).
195. See Singel, Labor Relations, supra note 192, at 691 n.3 (citing cases by the lower courts
of appeal).
196. See id. at 706-07 (citing Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116
(9th Cir. 1985)).
197. See 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
198. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 602, 606 (1916); see also Santa Clara Pueblo,
436 U.S. at 55-56 (citing Quiver, 241 U.S. at 602; Williams, 358 U.S. at 217).
199. The Grand Traverse Band Code now defines marriage as "the legal union of one (1) man
and one (1) woman as husband and wife for life or until divorced." 10 Grand Traverse Band Code
§ 501(e), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/gtcode/travcodelOchildfameld.htm.
200. Cf Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, Nos. 03-143, 1529-1530-1531, 1819,
2005.NACE.0000007 (Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Supreme Court 2005) (asserting
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian alien).
201. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 437-43; Frickey,
Congressional Intent, supra note 41, at 1210; Getches, Beyond, supra note 58, at 360; Getches,
Conquering, supra note 32, at 1654; Singel, Labor Relations, supra note 192, at 697-02.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Amendment applies to Secretarial elections relied on the federal interest
in the election.2 °2 The Grand Traverse Band Tribal Court, like most
tribal courts, relies on federal funds to some extent, but the reliance is
not mandated by federal law, unlike the elections in Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe. A federal court judgment that the marriage amendment
does not apply to Indian Country would retain the unusual consistency
of federal Indian law: the constitutional individual rights protections do
not apply to Indian tribes, but Congress has authority to legislate on
Indian affairs and bind the tribes.
But same-sex marriage may have more salience than other constitu-
tional provisions. Perhaps like abortion, the fact that a tribal jurisdiction
continues to authorize or prohibit same-sex marriage would generate
enormous controversy from outsiders and political pressure to force
these nonconforming tribes to stop. Perhaps there are some constitu-
tional individual rights protections that are so fundamental to American
society that that the federal courts would somehow see fit to extend
these restrictions on Indian tribes,2" 3 despite clear federal law to the con-
trary. The Eighth Circuit's decision on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
avoided the main problem by coating the governmental action com-
plained of with a federal cloak of authority, but with same-sex marriage
the same federal action would not occur. A decision extending the reach
of the marriage amendment to Indian Country would be unprecedented,
but not outside the realm of possibility."°
B. State Authority over Indian Tribes
Whether state laws banning or authorizing same-sex marriage could
be extended into Indian Country after a same-sex marriage amendment
excluding mention of Indian tribes is a closer question than whether the
amendment itself would apply to Indian tribes. Some state laws do
reach into Indian Country, with the Supreme Court's support, 20 5 but
state laws have never been held to reach further than federal laws into
the hard inner core of tribal authority over domestic relations.
202. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
203. Cf RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 132 (2006) ("[Iln some circumstances, fidelity
[to the Constitution] might be trumped by justice.").
204. Although the discussion is outside the scope of this Article, whether a same-sex marriage
amendment would apply at all to Indian Country may depend on the cultural context of same-sex
relationships. See Wenona T. Singel, What's Unique About the Same-Sex Marriage Debate in
Indian Country, Address at Helen Hamilton Day, University of North Dakota School of Law
(March 31, 2006).
205. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676, 688-89 (2005); Dept. of
Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 73-74 (1994); Rice v. Rehner,
463 U.S. 713, 718, 725-26 (1983).
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The possibility of using state authority to enforce a same-sex mar-
riage amendment against Indian tribes would seem fruitless where fed-
eral constitutional authority is lacking. However, the Supreme Court's
federal Indian law pronouncements suggest that state laws could pene-
trate tribal authority where significant (if not extreme) impacts of tribal
exercises of governmental authority extend beyond the Indian Country
borders. The Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,.. 6 in
upholding tribal authority to regulate Indian Country hunting and fishing
to the exclusion of New Mexico, relied on a rule providing for the opera-
tion of state laws in Indian Country where "the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority."2 7 These circum-
stances must be "exceptional."2 °8 And, according to Judge Canby, "[i]t
should be emphasized . . . that the occasions when states have been
permitted to regulate Indians in Indian country have been rare and truly
exceptional.""2 9 States have been permitted to regulate (or co-regulate)
tribal fishing rights,2"0 collect state taxes from tribal retailers, 11 and reg-
ulate on-reservation liquor sales.2 12 But in areas such as high-stakes
bingo and casino operations, states have little or no say under federal
Indian law.2 ,3
States have no authority to regulate on-reservation domestic rela-
tions, particularly, as the Laughing Whitefish case demonstrates.21 4
Additionally, in United States v. Quiver 2 5 a case holding that the fed-
eral government may not prosecute reservation Indians for adultery, Jus-
tice Van Devanter foreclosed the possibility of state jurisdiction over on-
reservation domestic relations. 2 6 Thus, it would be hard under normal
circumstances to find a state interest that would justify meeting the very
high standard set by the Court in the case of the Mescalero Apache
Tribe. If on-reservation high-stakes bingo does not meet the standard,
why would same-sex marriage? Same-sex marriage may not meet the
standard, but there is no constitutional provision dealing with bingo, and
thus that scenario is different than the circumstances proposed here.
Moreover, a federal court's conception of "justice" might undo this doc-
206. 462 U.S. 324, 324 (1983).
207. Id. at 334 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)).
208. Id. at 331-32 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 168 (1977)).
209. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 289 (4th ed. 2004).
210. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 433 U.S. at 173-75.
211. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
159, 161-62 (1980).
212. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720-22 (1983).
213. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1987).
214. See Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 605-06 (Mich. 1889).
215. 241 U.S. 602, 602 (1916).
216. See id. at 603, 606.
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trine of law.2 7 In short, the result is not foreordained or obvious.
C. The Potential Impact on Our Federalism and Federal Indian Law
A marriage amendment excluding mention of Indian tribes raises
recognition of Indian tribes as a constitutional player, if not full partici-
pant, in Our Federalism. As the law stands now, Indian tribes are
neither constitutional players nor constitutional outlaws. Indian tribes
do not enjoy the full pantheon of individual rights provided by the Con-
stitution, such as the right to state-paid indigent defense. 218 But neither
do tribes have felony jurisdiction.219 Some tribes are operating govern-
ments that could be classified as theocracies, 220 but others have a form
of Athenian direct democracy (including women and non-propertied
interests) 22' that goes beyond American representative democracy. 222
Tribes act outside the Constitution as "preconstitutional" or "extraconsti-
tutional" sovereigns.
But tribes as yet have neither done anything that sufficiently shocks
the constitutional conscience for a court to find that some or all of the
individual rights protections of the Constitution must apply to the
"preconstitutional" tribal sovereigns nor have they done anything suffi-
cient to induce the American people to amend the Constitution. Tribes
practiced polygamy 223 and interracial marriage 224 - no response. Tribes
exercised criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians225 - no response (at
217. See DWORKIN, supra note 203, at 132.
218. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2001) (granting right to counsel, but not right to government-
paid counsel).
219. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2001) (limiting tribal criminal penalties to one year).
220. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 118, at 361-62.
221. See Candido v. Viejas Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, No.
D043342, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6582, at *4 (Cal. App., July 13, 2004); Sandra Hansen,
Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country 1990, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 319, 319-20 (1991).
222. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195,
195-96 (1996); Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 709, 729 n.69 (1994) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 425 (Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke,
ed. 1961)). See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Direct Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411, 457 (2004) (discussing "historical and theological precedents that
contributed to the Framers' rejection of direct democracy at the constitutional Conventions).
223. See Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 605 (Mich. 1889).
224. See Johnson v. Johnson's Adm'r, 30 Mo. 72, 84, 86 (Mo. 1860); Morgan v. M'Ghee, 24
Tenn. 13, 14 (Tenn. 1844).
225. See George E. Foster, A Legal Episode in the Cherokee Nation, 4 GREEN BAG 484, 489-
90 (1892) (describing criminal trial of a non-Indian). See generally RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE
AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 168-74 (1975) (describing Cherokee
criminal law).
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least in the 19th century).22 6 Tribes opened gaming operations 227 - no
response. 22 8 The Supreme Court has often held that Indian tribes do not
have certain vestiges of their inherent sovereign authority,22 9 but it has
never held that the Constitution's individual rights protections apply to
limit or restrict the government operations of Indian tribes.
Would tribal nonconformance with the same-sex marriage amend-
ment shock the constitutional conscience? Let us assume it does and let
us assume that the Supreme Court's response 23 ° is similar to other times
when it disapproves of the actions of tribal governments - in other
words, implicit divestiture. A holding that Indian tribes do not, by virtue
of their dependent status, have inherent authority to recognize (or pro-
hibit) same-sex marriages would be expected and consistent with previ-
ous decisions. But unlike other times when the Court has found an
implicit divestiture, this case would be the first in which the implicit
divestiture was intended to force Indian tribes to act in conformance
with a specific individual rights provision of the Constitution. Other
implicit divestitures (criminal and civil jurisdiction,23' foreign nation
status, 23 property rights233) were not intended to force tribes to conform
to specific rights provisions in the Constitution.
Extending the logic of the result to other cases (mimicking Justice
Scalia 234) may result in the Court's invalidation of all tribal prosecutions
226. However, the Supreme Court divested Indian tribes of this authority in 1978, without
reference to a constitutional provision mandating such a result. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195, 197, 202 (1978).
227. See KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW AND POLICY
20-24 (2006).
228. In fact, the Court held that state laws could not apply to Indian gaming. See California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
229. E.g., Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (civil jurisdiction on non-Indian
lands); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195, 197, 202 (1978) (criminal jurisdiction
over nonmembers); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16, 17 (1831) (foreign nation status);
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589-90 (1823) (full assortment of land ownership fights).
230. It seems more probable that the Court would be quicker to act than Congress. Congress
could once again amend the Indian Civil Rights Act to include a provision on same-sex marriage,
but it would serve only to beg the question.
231. E.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 453; Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
232. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16, 17.
233. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589-90.
234. E.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding
is limited to training the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of
directions to go. What next? Will we deny priests and nuns their prescription-drug benefits on the
ground that taxpayers' freedom of conscience forbids medicating the clergy at public expense?
This may seem fanciful, but recall that France has proposed banning religious attire from schools,
invoking interests in secularism no less benign than those the Court embraces today."). See MARK
TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
150 (2005).
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for failure to conform to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to indi-
gent counsel.235 Perhaps the Court will then invalidate exercises of tri-
bal government authority establishing a religion. Though it is far from
certain, the Court could decide that tribal governments do not have to
conform to the Constitution. The Court could also divest tribes of all
authority to take actions contrary to the Constitution. By implication,
the Court could conclude that the Constitution does apply to Indian
tribes. Would this result differ from the conclusion that the First
Amendment applies to states?
236
If the Court concludes through a series of implicit divestiture deci-
sions - starting with a tribal same-sex marriage case - that the Constitu-
tion does apply to Indian tribes, then perhaps Indian tribes will become
part of Our Federalism. The logic follows: (1) Indian tribes are here to
stay as sovereigns; (2) the Court recognizes tribes as sovereigns; and (3)
the Court will apply (through the implicit divestiture doctrine) the Con-
stitution's individual rights provisions to the tribes. The only step miss-
ing (and it is the most important) is the language in the Constitution
incorporating Indian tribes. But similar language is missing from the
Fourteenth Amendment.237 Perhaps the logical conclusion of the
implicit divestiture doctrine, as the Court might have begun to explain it
(in terms of individual rights), is incorporation of Indian tribes into the
Federal Union. In other words, since the Constitution is a compact
among sovereigns, holding Indian tribes to the letter of the Constitution
amounts to recognition by the Court that tribes are part of the compact
between the federal government and the states.
CONCLUSION
Long ago, the Michigan Supreme Court identified a conundrum in
federal Indian law. "We must either hold that there can be no valid
Indian marriage, or we must hold that all marriages are valid by which
Indian usages are so regarded. There is no middle ground which can be
235. But see Christopher B. Chaney, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court's
Decisions During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14
BYU J. PuB. L. 173, 183-84 (2000); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing,
36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 403, 430-32 (2004).
236. See Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory
of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REv. 251, 327-28 (2000). Cf generally Jerold H. Israel,
Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982) (providing an early introduction
of the selective incorporation theory of the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960))); Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment
Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process
Clauses, 71 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=723501 (last
visited April 24, 2006).
237. See CURRIE, supra note 70, at 252.
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taken, so long as our own laws are not binding on the tribes. 2 38 That
conundrum remains, even after more than a hundred years of shifting
and inconsistent federal Indian policy and Supreme Court jurisprudence.
And the conundrum could be highlighted by a constitutional
amendment on same-sex marriage. In the arena of domestic relations,
either American law trumps tribal law or it does not. If American law
does not trump tribal law, even after an amendment, then Indian tribes
remain constitutional outlaws, retaining inherent sovereignty and exer-
cising the sovereign powers of a third sovereign alive and well within
Our Federalism. If American law trumps tribal law after an amendment,
then Indian tribes become part of Our Federalism by virtue of incorpora-
tion into the Constitution.
Indian tribes are part of Our Federalism one way or the other. A
same-sex marriage amendment might bring incorporation of Indian
tribes into the Constitution to the forefront because domestic relations,
the particular subject matter of the amendment, would create an unex-
pected constitutional crisis. For Indian tribes seeking entry into the con-
stitutional structure (and not all tribes do), the crisis would be more of an
opportunity. But for the Court, struggling to balance its federalism juris-
prudence between just two sovereigns, 39 the addition of Indian tribes as
a third constitutional sovereign may force it to push the reset button on
federal Indian law.
238. Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 605 (Mich. 1889).
239. Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005) (holding that federal
criminalization of medicinal marijuana did not violate Commerce Clause), with Gonzales v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916-17 (2006) (finding that U.S. Attorney General did not have authority
to prevent state from authorizing physician-assisted suicide).
